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Abstract 
The criticisms and points made by both Michelson
(http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v10n8/) and Willson and Kellow
(http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v10n9/) in response to my article "Significance
of Test-based Ratings" (http://epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v9n42/) are here
addressed.
 
Michelson's Complaints
Michelson's critique of "Significance of Test-based Ratings" rides herd on some fine
points but misses main themes of the article. The article's data include test scores for
only 47 schools. As experts have warned, such a small behavioral data set can typically
provide stable coefficients for only one or two independent variables. The work leading
to the article aimed to see if one or two strong variables could be found for this limited
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data set. As it happened, a dominant variable was found: community income.
In seeking an expanded analysis, Michelson overloads the observations with
independent variables, adding some with no evidence for underlying quality. While his
approach associates more variance with a larger set of variables, he does not provide
stepwise or combinatorial analysis for the incremental association of variance or conduct
a sensitivity study to explore the likelihood that his results may be an artifact. Despite an
undiscriminating approach, community income remains the strongest factor.
The article, by contrast, emphasizes robust results obtained from accurate, traceable data
and parsimonious models. It employs cross-validation, sensitivity analysis and
combinatorial analysis. Weighting is introduced to construct models that will not be
destabilized by smaller schools contributing to the data set.
Apparently unsatisfied with his alternative, since community income is still the strongest
factor, Michelson proceeds with polemics centered around the notion that the article
really has no news anyway, since (somehow) everybody knows that high test scores go
along with high incomes. Maybe everyone in his circle does, but many people I
encounter are surprised; they wonder why this should be so.
It is known, if not well known, that by the early 1920s labor unions mounted protests
against the social injustice of using IQ scores to place students in academic "tracks."
They had found out that high IQ scores were strongly associated with high family
incomes. It is also known, if not well known, that by the mid-1950s the Educational
Testing Service had found a regular progression of their average SAT scores with
average reported family incomes. But these results are for "aptitude" tests.
There have been limited published studies about the associations of social and school
factors with state "accountability" test scores. Will such a test be similar in social
correlates to "aptitude" tests, or will it be different? Massachusetts is a useful laboratory
for such a study. It did not begin "accountability" testing until 1998. It then created what
is generally regarded as a state-of-the-art program.
The Massachusetts graduation requirement will not directly affect any student until
2003. Although Massachusetts has some communities with a history of aggressive
testing, such as Worcester, before the school year ending in 2000 most schools made
light to moderate responses to MCAS tests. These circumstances help provide a good
baseline.
Problems for such studies are the rare availability of reliable, personal social-factors data
and the limited social-factors data that one can clearly associate with individual schools.
Most data collected and reported by schools either count disadvantaged populations or
count eligibility for free or reduced-price lunch. This produces two common outcomes.
One is correlations found for test scores with population categories. The other is
correlations found between test scores and poverty, since poverty or near-poverty
income is the qualification for free or reduced-price lunch.
Beginning with Massachusetts school profiles, I also found those correlations. But being
familiar with the communities for which I had data, I decided to look at residuals. To me
the residuals seemed to show a pattern—high score-residuals in high-income
communities and vice-versa. Data for disadvantaged populations, poverty and other
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school categories did not appear to tell the whole story, so I sought income data for
school populations.
It turned out that the only generally available data were from the 1989 U.S. Census of
Population and Housing. Somewhat to my surprise, per-capita community income from
a decade prior to the test scores proved to be a strong and robust factor. The article
recounts the modeling of data in the sequence it occurred.
The major theme, which Michelson does seem to understand, is that income appears to
matter at all ordinary levels, not just at the threshold of poverty. Part of this may be
self-fulfilling prophecy, when test scores are used to grant or deny advancement, but
there is probably more. I don't accept Michelson's guesses about the phenomenon. I have
different hypotheses but won't trust those either without evidence.
Another theme, which Michelson seems to ignore, is that community income, as distinct
from family income, may have a powerful effect. That is merely a suggestion in the
article, of course. It would take a study of individuals to differentiate the influences.
A fortuitous circumstance for this study was the pattern of New England cities and
towns, which form legal boundaries around small, diverse clusters of population. That
can also be found elsewhere in the U.S., such as near Philadelphia or Cleveland, but in
the more recently settled areas it is rare. Instead, a large city has usually been allowed to
swallow up many neighbors, and the remaining suburbs do not have the diversity of the
urban neighborhoods. Social data collected within city boundaries can be very difficult
to reaggregate, as happens in the City of Boston.
The following paragraphs respond to Michelson's observations item by item:
(1) Michelson first complains about what he calls a "non-sequitur." The article's abstract
says, "The state [of Massachusetts] is treating scores and ratings as though they were
precise educational measures of high significance." And indeed it is doing just that. As
the article later points out, getting 23 instead of 24 correct answers on a tenth-grade
mathematics test can be enough for Massachusetts to deny a student a high-school
diploma. Such a small difference can produce a huge effect, since high-school
graduation has great influence on lifetime income.
The article's abstract goes on to say that a "review of tenth-grade mathematics test
scores...showed that statistically [Massachusetts scores and ratings] are not [precise
educational measures of high significance]." And indeed the scores are not precise. As
the article shows, the variability of score averages is so large that at least several years
will be needed to see whether there are definite trends for most schools. As the article
also shows, the educational significance of the scores is highly questionable. As with
"aptitude" tests, scores closely track income levels. Once predictions based on income
have been subtracted, few schools can be distinguished. There is little to indicate that
these scores may measure what schools achieve, as contrasted with what social
advantages or disadvantages students bring to schools from their backgrounds.
(2) Michelson complains the article "has not said what success on these tests is supposed
to imply." That's not my job; it's the job of an agency in charge of the tests. What the
article says is that no studies "have shown that MCAS test scores have practical
significance, in the sense of predicting success in adult activities to any greater degree
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than could be done with knowledge of student backgrounds."
It should be a responsibility of government, when using tests so as to cause drastic life
consequences for young people under its care, to demonstrate objectively that its tests
accurately and fairly measure skills of critical and lasting importance. Massachusetts has
failed to do this. It merely says its tests are similar to other tests, which also lack
practical validation. A physician acting in such a cavalier way toward a patient would be
at risk of fines or jail.
The topic of the article, however, is school ratings. We maintain public schools to equip
all young people with skills and knowledge essential to support themselves and to carry
out civic responsibility. Schools in rich and poor communities alike strive to do this.
School ratings that mostly track incomes of communities are unlikely to reflect actual
levels of effort or achievement by the schools. The Massachusetts tests lack practical
validation, and the ratings based on those tests appear to measure characteristics of
communities more than they do those of schools.
(3) Michelson complains about dropping Boston schools from part of the data analysis.
That part of the analysis focuses on community income. As the article indicates, given
Boston's complex mix of exam schools, magnet schools, district schools,
cross-enrollment and busing, it was not possible to determine community income for
individual schools. If one wants to expand the data set, it would more fruitful to add
other Massachusetts cities and towns than to spend the large amount of effort needed to
reaggregate Boston data by schools with any accuracy.
(4) Michelson complains about weighting by number of test takers, but aside from an
appeal to prejudice he does not try to explain why an unweighted analysis would be of
more use. For example, one way to handle complaint (3) might be to aggregate all of
Boston's schools and use citywide per-capita income and other factors. Would it then be
useful to treat all of Boston, with a population of 589,141, as equivalent in weight to
Winthrop, with a population of 18,303? Despite this grievance, as Michelson later
shows, unweighted analysis leads to similar patterns of results. No reviewer of this
article raised concerns about weighted models.
(5) Michelson objects to lack of a marker variable for schools with vocational programs
in the same facility as academic programs. However, some such schools have only
vestigial programs, while other schools enroll large fractions of their students in
vocational programs, with year-to-year changes depending on local circumstances.
Massachusetts school profiles did not record these programs uniformly when study data
were assembled and do not provide program enrollments. A marker variable can be
wildly inaccurate. Later Michelson also proposes a marker variable for exam schools.
Boston's exam schools are known to vary widely in selectivity, and a marker variable
will not account for that.
(6) Michelson's complaint about weighting by numbers of test takers while also
including school population as a variable in one of the analysis steps is reasonable; the
correlation is quite high. However, I supplied Michelson with a file of all data used for
the article. As I saw and he should readily have found, both weighted and unweighted
analysis show low significance for this variable. I did not think that putting an additional
analysis into the article would add much information, but perhaps a comment about
checking unweighted analysis should have appeared.
5 of 17
(7) Michelson's complaint about using only "per pupil expenditure" (regular education)
as an estimator for financial support is directed to the wrong party. Massachusetts
citizens have protested for years about poor reporting of school spending. As the article
says in an appendix, Massachusetts is finally adopting a uniform system of detailed
financial reporting. The first published data from the new system will be available some
time in 2004.
(8) Michelson makes an attempt to estimate cross-effects of Boston's exam school
system in lowering scores of district schools. However, as the article says, there is
evidence that many ambitious parents whose offspring who are not accepted to an exam
school of their choice send them outside Boston public schools: to parochial schools,
other private schools and suburban schools. It would take far more resources than the
data for this study provide to investigate cross-enrollment effects accurately.
(9) Michelson objects to the use of unadjusted R2 to report the variance associated in
successive steps of analysis. This would be a reasonable complaint if there were no
dominant variable and one needed to account in detail for relative contributions of
multiple variables, but that was not the result found in the study. Using adjusted R2
would intensify the dominance of the community income variable, because adjusted R2
values obtained when adding more variables to a model are lower than unadjusted
values. In his use of adjusted R2, Michelson does not show that the assumptions of
adjustment are actually satisfied for the data.
(10) Under "A Change of Method," Michelson again objects to dropping Boston schools
from part of the analysis and seems to miss the point where the change occurs. He states
that text following Table 2-10 and a figure in Table 2-13 report an unadjusted R2 value 
of .80 for three variables, while Table 2-15, he says, reports a value of .86 for only two
variables. This seems to puzzle him; he says he can "see no reason for" it.
Actually, the R2 value of .86 for two variables is reported in the paragraph preceding
Table 2-14. This paragraph begins by saying that analysis starting with that table applies
"only to schools outside the City of Boston." A possible cause of the increase in R2
values is, as the article says, that one cannot accurately determine community income for
individual Boston schools. When analyzing mainly schools with unambiguous
community income, one is looking at a less noisy data set. The procedure and the reason
for it are clearly stated.
(11) In his objections to the article's use of unadjusted R2, Michelson makes much of the
difference in R2 values between the analyses that include the Boston schools and those
that don't. Unlike Michelson, the article does not try to compare R2 between these 
analyses. They don't use the same data set. Without knowing what is not known about
the social factors for individual Boston schools, comparisons like those Michelson
suggests will not be meaningful.
(12) Michelson also seems unsure when weighted or unweighted analysis is being used.
Weighting by number of test participants is described in the paragraph preceding Table
2-3, the first analysis reported in the article, and was used for that and all following
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analyses (except, as the article states, those in Figure 2-3). Readers are occasionally
reminded that models are being weighted in this way. If Michelson uses unweighted
analysis or a different weighting factor, such as school population, then he will get
different results.
(13) Michelson's Table 2 and Table 3 offer what he calls an "all schools replication" of
analyses in Table 2-14 and Table 2-16 of the article. The two paragraphs preceding
Table 2-14 in the article discuss problems of reaggregating data for Boston schools and
introduce analyses that consider only the remaining schools, reported in Tables 2-14
through 2-16. An "all schools replication" is not a replication. Since he doesn't use the
same data set in his Tables 2 and 3, Michelson gets different results. When he uses the
same data set in his Tables 4 and 5, he gets the same results as the article contains.
Michelson notes a concern about excluding only Boston schools in Table 2-14 and Table
2-16, since Quincy, Lynn and Newton also have multiple high schools. The article
makes the same observation in its summary analysis, Section 2.D, and presents in Tables
2-20 and 2-21 and in Figures 2-8 through 2-10 results excluding all four of these
communities from the data set.
(14) Again, Michelson objects to dropping Boston schools from the data set and
proposes a different model into which he introduces marker variables, "Michelson's
5-Factor Model." I considered such an approach during the study but rejected it for the
reasons stated under his complaint (5): these marker variables may wildly misrepresent
what they claim to identify. In rejecting weighting for his model, Michelson exposes it to
instability from smaller schools that are well off the trend lines. He does not explain his
reasons for the choice.
Here, from a reader's perspective, Michelson is exploring new ground. He has different
techniques for analyzing different sets of data and seems to have different motives. His
model ignores conservative recommendations for behavioral data by using too many
variables in a final model for the size of the data set. He does not try to overcome the
potential problems in this approach with a sensitivity study to explore probable ranges of
results from such a model. He does not review any potential weakness of his marker
variables. He does not provide readers with stepwise or combinatorial analysis for
incremental association of variance, only first and last steps. He does not attempt any
cross-validation. He does not explain his rejection of weighting. The results shown in
Michelson's Figure 1 may represent a robust pattern, or they may be a statistical artifact.
As previously stated, the article emphasizes robust results obtained from accurate,
traceable data and parsimonious models. It employs cross-validation in Table 2-13,
sensitivity analysis in the exploration of outliers in and near Tables 2-18 and 2-19, and
combinatorial analysis in Table 2-12. Weighting is introduced beginning at Table 2-3 to
construct models that will not be destabilized by smaller schools contributing to the data
set.
(15) Besides offering no stepwise or combinatorial analysis of his own, Michelson
objects to such analysis in the article, shown in Table 2-12 and 2-15 and discussed in
Section 2.C. A curious objection, since stepwise and combinatorial analyses are
common, helpful approaches to understanding the relative influences of multiple factors.
A better objection would have been to call at this point for the use of adjusted R2, since 
when the assumptions of adjustment can be satisfied, the adjustment will discount added
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factors of low significance.
(16) Michelson characterizes the article's discussion of limited English proficiency as
"political" and claims the article largely ignores it. Readers can judge for themselves.
Section 2.C of the article says, "The factor ‘Percent limited English proficiency' was the
second strongest influence on predicted test scores." It offers hypotheses for further
investigation suggested by this finding. It then goes on to discuss relative significance of
factors "Percent African American," "Percent Hispanic / Latino," and "Percent Asian or
Pacific Islander." (Unlike Michelson, I prefer longer, more informative factor names to
"bosnoex" and other mysterious abbreviations.)
(17) Michelson claims the article ignores what he calls "specification" effects in the
evolution of model equations. In fact, several parts of the article address just such
effects, and the article as a whole is an extended model development.
In particular, the discussion of Table 2-6 emphasizes how an economic factor captures
variance otherwise associated with disadvantaged populations. Table 2-7 is presented to
show how a model without the economic factor loads significance onto population
categories. The analysis in Table 2-12 shows how different model equations reveal the
weakness of one factor. Discussion around Table 2-14 shows how the factor "Per-capita
community income (1989)" supplants the significance of the factor "Percent free or
reduced price lunch." (Unlike Michelson, I assume readers are familiar with such effects
and do not need a lecture.)
(18) Arguing about his marker variable for vocational programs, Michelson ignores the
lack of data characterizing the programs or the students who enroll in them. It might be
that the programs draw many students from low-income families or families who do not
speak standard English as a first language. It might be that the programs neglect skills or
knowledge being tested by MCAS. There could also be a combination of these factors,
or there might be some critical but wholly different factor. Data available for the study
were insufficient to address the issue, and the article says so. I believe it is unwise for
Michelson to introduce a marker variable without investigating the environment.
(19) Similarly, arguing about his marker variable for Boston exam schools, Michelson
relies on personal recollections and anecdotes, but he ignores the complex social
characteristics of Boston and the lack of reliable data for estimating cross-enrollment
effects, which only begin with the exam schools. A study by the Mumford Center at the
University of Albany indicates that parochial and other private schools have such large
effects that the incidence of poverty among the households of Boston public school
students substantially exceeds the incidence in the city population. As with vocational
programs, data available for the study were insufficient, and the article says so. Again, I
believe it is unwise for Michelson to introduce a marker variable without investigating
the environment.
(20) Caught up in personal anecdotes, Michelson ignores findings about individual
communities reported in the article that appear significant. Belmont substantially
outscored predictions, while Marblehead scores were considerably lower than predicted.
Sensitivity analysis suggests robust results, not artifacts. Neither community is known
for extremes in population or education; a review that compares and contrasts them
might be of interest and of practical use.
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(21) Michelson's objections to the residuals discussion around Figures 2-4 and 2-5 in the
article ignores the increase in slope of the line of fit. These figures were placed in
sequence so that this effect could be easily seen. Michelson is correct in his observation
that annual score averages and score changes are limited predictors—the point made
with Figures 2-9 and 2-10 in the article. With Michelson's scatterplot of successive year
residuals from "Michelson's 5-Factor Model" in his Figure 3, he might raise a question
about the anomalous behavior of Swampscott, which the article called attention to in
discussing Table 2-11.
(22) Under "The Town View," Michelson begs the question of the article. He contends
that "the highest scoring students are exactly who we would expect them to be, those
from the highest income places...." Yes, if you look at the plot of average scores versus
income in the abstract of the article, that is what you would expect. But if you hadn't
seen the data, would you know? Perhaps, as he seems to suggest, Michelson is privy to
inside information. Most of us have to look at the data to find out.
(23) Michelson's "Final Remarks" include the polemics previously mentioned. In these,
he contends that "MCAS tests are designed to measure individual achievement" and
seems to want to make this an affair of honor. True or false, meaningful or otherwise,
that's not the topic of the article, which also seems to have escaped Michelson. Likewise,
the article is concerned neither with what Michelson calls "beliefs" about its findings nor
(certainly, in an article using statistical inference) with causality.
Summary of Response to Michelson
The topic of the article, "Significance of Test-based Ratings for Metropolitan Boston
Schools," is the meaning and usefulness of school ratings that are entirely based on
MCAS test scores. The article shows, for the years and tests it reports, that within the
variations of test score averages the Massachusetts Department of Education could have
produced nearly the same ratings simply by scaling income data from the Department of
Revenue. As an appendix to the article notes, Section 1I in Chapter 69 of the
Massachusetts General Laws directs the Department of Education to set up a school
rating system with a broader approach than it has used so far:
"The system shall employ a variety of assessment instruments on either a
comprehensive or statistically valid sampling basis. Such instruments...shall
include consideration of work samples, projects and portfolios, and shall
facilitate authentic and direct gauges of student performance."
This provision was written when the state was administering tests on a sampling basis
that were inspired by NAEP, which tries to acknowledge a variety of learning
orientations. In narrowing its current approach to a single test series, Massachusetts may
have emphasized only the cognitive skills sampled by "aptitude" tests. Certainly it fails
to honor the spirit of its laws.
Unlike the impression Michelson gives of his outlook, I don't see statistical analysis as a
card game, playing to get a high multiple R score while discounting the quality of data.
Statistics won't identify causes or distinguish causes from effects. At best one can find
robust patterns that justify investigation by other means. Knowing, for example, that
community income provides a strong, persistent factor for certain test scores may
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motivate someone to find out why this happens and might eventually lead to better
understanding of how or what to teach or test.
Knowing that factors may have some influence will not help an investigator unless their
influence is major. In this vein, someone with a scientific or engineering background
will tend to apply a p<0.05 criterion as a rough, first cut—the criterion to which
Michelson takes such pained exception. That isn't a signal of existential meaning; it's a
value judgement. If there isn't much more than a 95 percent chance of significance, then
another phenomenon is probably a better object of one's attention. Anyone who tries to
chase down all the "Michelson 5-Factor[s]" with surveys or experiments is risking a
waste of energy in blind alleys.
Michelson's reported confusions with the article suggest that he would really like to
analyze different data sets with different techniques. That's fair, of course, and it might
yield some new information. But it really proposes a different article, which Michelson
seems to have begun in the guise of a critique.
As "Significance of Test-based Ratings" shows, Massachusetts school ratings, based
solely on MCAS test scores, are not precise educational measures of high significance.
Score variations are large, and scores appear to reflect heavily the social advantages or
disadvantages that students bring to schools from their backgrounds, not necessarily the
effectiveness of the schools themselves.
Willson's and Kellow's Concerns
Willson's and Kellow's concerns about "Significance of Test-based Ratings" focus
largely on what they say are "theoretical" and standards issues. The article presents data,
models and correlations associating state "accountability" test scores used to construct
school ratings with social and school characteristics. It does not endorse any
"theoretical" framework or invoke any institutional standard of judgement. Willson and
Kellow also raise issues about construction and content of tests and discuss data
developed by identifying individual students. While these are reasonable subjects of
inquiry, they are not the topic of the article.
The article explores the potential significance of school ratings based on "accountability"
test scores. The study on which the article was based looked at average test scores and
social and school factors for 47 geographically clustered schools to see if one or two
strong factors could be found for this limited data set. A dominant factor was found:
community incomes. Results show that the test scores track community incomes so
closely that it is questionable whether the scores measure efforts or effectiveness of the
schools.
Willson and Kellow seem to feel that income inequities should no longer be considered
particularly relevant to educational issues, since funding has been equalized. Although
both their home state of Texas and mine of Massachusetts have school funding
equalization programs, both states also continue to encounter strong disagreements and
lawsuits over the issue, for example:
"In a lawsuit filed against the state of Texas, lower-wealth school districts
allege that the state's current funding scheme for education fails to meet the
equity and efficiency standards established by a 1994 Texas Supreme Court
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decision. Plaintiffs in the suit claim that tax exemptions for, among other
things, country clubs and sports franchises represent lost property tax
revenues that would otherwise be allocated to funding the state's schools.
These breaks reduce school funding by an estimated $500 million,
according to the plaintiffs. A statewide property tax to correct the state's
school funding inequities failed in the last session of the Texas legislature."
(from Texas Education Funding, 1998)
"Residents Advocating Government Equity, or RAGE, sought $50,000 from
Barnstable County to continue a private lawsuit, brought in the name of
eight Cape schoolchildren to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court.
The suit asks the court to intervene and make the state legislature carry out
its constitutional duty to adequately finance aid to schools. That includes
changing the aid formula to better serve towns like those on the Cape, with
relatively high property values but also with high growth rates. Several
Cape towns are also owed $14.7 million in back aid." (from Milton, 1999)
Willson and Kellow don't consider recent evidence such as Grissmer, et al., 2000, that 
income levels may influence test scores independently of school funding. In Figures 2-6
and 2-7 the article "Significance of Test-based Ratings" shows, for the communities
studied, that per-capita community income is strongly associated with average test
scores while school spending shows very little association with average test scores.
Willson and Kellow make a vague statement that "all sorts of predictors" (other than
income) might produce strong correlations with test scores, but they don't offer any
evidence. Why not? If strong predictors were so easy to come across, surely they could
dredge up a few. Actually, an appendix to the article provided Willson and Kellow with
real data to test such a proposition, the social and school factors that the article analyzes.
The results are in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Scatterplots of scores versus factors
The scatterplots in Figure 1 of this response include the schools contributing to the
summary analysis of the article, in its Figures 2-8 through 2-10. The ordinate of each
scatterplot is the school-averaged test score for 1999. Although several factors have
significant correlations, Factor 8 provided dominant and robust association of variance
in a multifactor model. In the article, this factor is identified as "Per-capita community
income (1989)." Another factor proportional to community income would certainly act
as an effective substitute.
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Willson and Kellow maintain that using "aggregate measures" may yield "misleading
conclusions." Possibly—but from what kind of data are the test-based school rating
systems themselves constructed? "Aggregate measures," I believe. Willson and Kellow
don't seem to be disturbed that all test-based school rating systems, those they like as
well as those they don't, are subject to similar potentials for distortion.
In their objections about "mixing levels of analysis," Willson and Kellow do not seem to
have followed the article closely. Preliminary analyses through Table 2-8 use only
school-based data. Intermediate steps, introducing per-capita incomes from the census,
warn about problems from mixing levels. The summary analysis, Section 2.D, presents
in Tables 2-20 and 2-21 and in Figures 2-8 through 2-10 the results from only
communities with a single high school. For those schools, there is only one level. The
summary analysis has no level mixing.
Despite sensitivities over "mixing levels of analysis," Willson and Kellow sometimes
seem to confound issues of evaluating personal test scores in the context of personal
factors with issues of evaluating test-based school ratings in the context of school and
community factors. The article is focused on the latter topic, not the former.
Willson and Kellow say that measures such as percentages of students qualified for free
or reduced-price lunch would be "more appropriate" than per-capita income for the
purposes of the article—an opinion they don't explain or defend. The article shows that
test scores are closely associated with incomes at all income levels found in the
communities studied. Its results suggest that community income, as distinct from family
income, may have substantial influence. A study of individuals would be needed to
resolve the influences.
When typical incomes were well beyond poverty levels, as in many communities studied
for the article, the percentage of high-school students qualified for free or reduced-price
lunch became a poor proxy for income. A model using income directly was statistically
much more effective. Willson and Kellow argue that this would be less of a problem for
elementary-school students, but they neither cite nor present evidence. In a study focused
on lower-income Florida communities Tschinkel, 1999, did find an association between
test scores and "supported lunch" that was about as strong as the article finds between
test scores and income for Massachusetts communities near Boston.
Willson and Kellow review MCAS tests and AREA/APS Standards (Committee, 1985, 
1999), but the article does not invoke those or any other institutional standards. It is not
focused on testing at a personal level, as standards are. Instead it is concerned with
school ratings based on test scores. However, in this context Willson and Kellow are
surely aware that jurisdictions such as California and Chicago ignored some of the
AREA/APS standards in using commercial achievement tests for promotion and
graduation tests. Other jurisdictions such as Texas and Massachusetts claim they comply
with those standards but have legalistic interpretations.
Scattterplot data from Texas that Willson and Kellow show in their first figure could not
be compared with data from Massachusetts in the article, because Willson and Kellow
did not provide data, cite a source from which to obtain data, or translate their
"economic disadvantage" index to income. They do not say whether their index reflects
household or community income, nor do they evaluate the accuracy of the index as an
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income proxy for communities with typical incomes well above poverty.
There is a further, critical problem in trying to compare results from the Texas
"accountability" testing program with those from Massachusetts. As many experiences
show, teachers, students and parents adapt defensively to testing programs—the higher
the stakes, in general, the stronger the defenses. Education agencies also respond in a
variety of ways to public reactions. Massachusetts patterns from 1998-1999 might be
compared with Texas patterns from 1985-1986, when Texas testing began, but
Massachusetts tests from 1998-1999 more closely resemble contemporaneous Texas
tests than the Texas tests from 1985-1986.
Texas started "accountability" testing in 1985 and is now more than ten years into a
second generation of tests (TAAS). It has been enforcing a graduation test requirement
and maintaining its Accountability Rating System for more than eight years. By the late
1990s, there were widespread reports of weeks spent on test cramming, of "TAAS
rallies," of heavy school spending on test prep materials and consultants, and of scandals
over falsifying reports (see McNeil, 2000, for examples). Some observers such as
Haney, 2000, suspect dropout rates have been redefined to conceal problems.
Massachusetts started "accountability" testing in 1998. Its graduation requirement will
not directly affect any student until 2003. Massachusetts has some communities with a
history of aggressive testing, such as Worcester; but before the school year ending in
2000 most schools made light to moderate responses to MCAS tests, and the Board of
Education discounted most concerns about higher dropout rates.
Baseline data for "Significance of Test-based Ratings" were from 1998 and 1999, the
quietest years of the MCAS program. Differences between those years were used to
estimate variability, and the 1999 scores were used for most of the effects models. These
data reflect conditions of Massachusetts schools before most strong responses. Scores
from 2001, unavailable when the study was conducted, clearly show effects of strong
responses, which will probably grow. Under state threats to take over or close
low-scoring schools, there have already been heavy efforts to increase scores in some
schools, involving test cramming that would be familiar to Texans; and there have been
widely reported score increases.
In a short paragraph after their Texas scatterplot data, Willson and Kellow again object
to correlating income with test scores, claiming income to be "uninterpretable." One is
reminded of Tevye from Fiddler: "Impossible! Impossible!" Of course, the interpretation
is entirely possible. Grissmer, et al., 2000, do it, the Nader organization does it, the
Educational Testing Service does it, and if they try a bit harder, Willson and Kellow can
do it too.
Willson and Kellow advocate teaching and learning metrics sometimes called the
"value-added model" (e.g., by McLean, et al., 1998). Sanders has popularized a variant
of this approach, and he supports it commercially (Sanders & Horn, 1995). The stability
and significance of ratings based on such methods have recently been questioned by
Kane & Staiger, 2001b, who also estimate contributions to score volatility from several
sources.
Consistent with the article's observation (not "error") under Figure 2-10, Willson and
Kellow also find year-to-year score changes exhibiting low significance. The
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Massachusetts Department of Education uses a score-change metric (Mass. DoE, 1999) 
slightly more robust than year-to-year changes. Kane & Staiger, 2001a, propose filters 
applied to several years of scores for better metrics. Willson and Kellow might compare
score volatility estimates, by sources, that were obtained by Kane & Staiger, 2001b, 
from North Carolina elementary school testing against the within-year and between-year
score variations from Texas testing.
Willson and Kellow complain that the article does not explore the content of MCAS
tests. As previously stated, the article's focus is on significance of test scores for
constructing school ratings, not on internal properties of the tests. However, the article
provided Willson and Kellow with references to the full MCAS test content (Mass. DoE, 
2000a, for 2000) and technical manual (Mass. DoE, 2000b, for 1999), which
Massachusetts publishes on the Internet. They have had unlimited access to these
documents for any reviews they find "appropriate."
In their Table 3, Willson and Kellow present a correlation matrix of score changes from
Texas elementary schools plus social and school factors. Again it was not possible to
compare Texas data with Massachusetts data from the article. The article associates
factors with scores, while Willson and Kellow associate them with score changes for
cohorts of identified students. There are also at least two major problems with results
that Willson and Kellow present. First, they have score changes with high volatility.
Obtaining a robust pattern would require multiple years, perhaps with filters such as
Kane & Staiger, 2001a, propose. Second, they have social and school factors with
substantial correlations, but they offer no multifactor model and no stepwise or
combinatorial analysis of variance.
Willson's and Kellow's title for their critique echoes a shopworn slogan of the education
hustlers: that school-based standard test scores are sending us a "message." Other than a
bundle of sticks, what might that message be? A question rarely asked about
"accountability" programs is whether their tests measure anything useful. What they
measure is whether a test-taker, in a constrained situation, can interpret isolated
fragments of information, solve small, arbitrary puzzles, recall miscellaneous items, or
write in a simplistic style. Otherwise such situations may rarely be encountered—except
perhaps with crossword puzzles or quiz shows.
Life's challenges are hardly ever so neatly packaged as the questions on a school-based
standard test. They are often far more difficult: grasping people's real wants and needs,
seeing advantages where others see limitations, organizing experience to make sense of
it, understanding one's own blind spots, persisting against adversity, motivating people
and guiding them. In most circumstances other than getting certificates that depend on
results from those tests, how would the results be of practical use? Attempts to measure
education effectiveness using the current generations of state "accountability" tests may
be mansions built on sand.
Associations of incomes with "aptitude" test scores have been recognized in the U.S. for
more than 80 years. There are related studies about effects of poverty on cognitive
development, such as Smith, et al., 1997, but the underlying behaviors at higher incomes
are not understood much better now than they were in the 1920s. Flynn, 1984, showed 
that average IQ scores have been rising dramatically over time, suggesting that the
underlying behaviors involve training or experience. Recently Dickens & Flynn, 2001, 
proposed an interpretive model, but so far little investigation of it has been reported.
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State "accountability" tests may be heavily weighted for the same cognitive skills that
are sampled by "aptitude" tests, leading to associations with income like those that
"Significance of Test-based Ratings" finds.
As this article shows, Massachusetts school ratings, based solely on MCAS test scores,
are not precise educational measures of high significance. Score variations are large, and
scores appear to reflect heavily the social advantages or disadvantages that students
bring to schools from their backgrounds, not necessarily the effectiveness of the schools
themselves.
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